Social order and theme

 In the 1960s and 1970s, facing the mainstream sociological discourse woven by positivism and structural functionalism, Garfunkel's ordinary human methodology tried to subvert his rule from the perspective of daily life practice. In his view, mainstream sociology's formal analysis of the model of social order obtained by quantitative technology is only a general representation theory, but mainstream sociology mistakenly regards the order reconstructed by this theory as objective. really. ⑦⑧⑨Garfinkel H., Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002, p.66, 97, 140, 148. On the contrary, Garfinkel requires Going back to the specific situations of daily life, there is no mystery hidden behind the collective practice of local daily life. “Ordinary people’s methodology does not engage in the work of interpreting signs”, ⑦though social order requires language To clarify, but the "things" of social order (the Things of social order) are not in the language. ⑧In fact, Garfunkel tried to reinterpret Durkheim’s motto: "The objective reality of social facts is the basic principle of sociology." But he is not a Durkheimian social determinist, and opposes the transformation of social facts into a product of discourse reconstruction like the formal analysis influenced by Durkheim. Garfunkel understands Durkheim's so-called "thing" in the sense of social facts as the inherent characteristics of daily life practice, which can be directly experienced and witnessed, and can be seen and heard. ⑨It is under the guidance of this kind of thinking that the programmatic task of the ordinary human methodology advocated by Garfinkel lies in the study of the collective, cooperative, and local areas where members of society construct social order in the context of daily life. Sexual, endogenous, repetitive, recognized, understandable, explainable, indexed, witnessable, unmediated, consistent practical activities or work (work) to show these members of society The method of practice or work, thus showing that the phenomenon of order is nothing but the achievement of the daily practical activities of cooperation, and to reform the technical rationality obsessed by form analysis. It can be seen that Garfunkel has accepted the fundamental emphasis of phenomenology and phenomenological sociology on the world of daily life, adopted Parsons’s thesis on social order, and absorbed Mead’s ideas on daily interaction. Trying to explore how social order is constructed in the interaction of daily life world. He refused to adopt the discoveries and methods of formal analysis, and advocated an indifferent attitude towards the views and methods of formal analysis. ②③Garfinkel H., Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002, pp.170, 92, 117～118. In his opinion, formal analysis ignores concrete practice The meaning of construction, the meaning of practice cannot be grasped by observing and recording the appearance of practice. To grasp these meanings requires researchers to understand practice in a localized way.

Although Garfunkel has absorbed the phenomenological life world theory and focused on the meaningful interactive practice of daily life, this does not mean that Garfunkel agrees with a subjectivism or even individualism. position. In fact, he opposes the interpretation of individual actions based on the subjectivity of the individual, and opposes the reduction of the “things” of the social order to people’s own unique originals, because different people will adopt similar commons in the same situation. Practice to produce a similar order. This structural feature of the social order implies great repetition of practice. Garfunkel believes that social order is immortal relative to the producers of those orders, and it precedes specific producers. Existence will be co-produced by other producers after they leave. In Garfunkel's view, the sufficient condition for guiding action should be the specific order in the situation (that is, the appearance of order objects, which implies the consistency of common sense not determined by the individual, and it can guide action, just like finding a way. It is the same as the road signs used at the time), instead of the things in people’s minds, Garfunkel is concerned with the order level of the situation, not the subjectivity of the individual in the situation (the consistency of common sense cannot be determined by the subjectivity of the individual Explanation. However, this opposition itself implies a kind of dualism, and it also means that Garfunkel cannot fundamentally solve the dualism problem). But this does not mean that Garfunkel supports a structuralist argument. In his view, the structuralist view ignores the active characteristics of daily actors and simply reduces the social order to a structural operation. The social structure is not an objectively given reality, or an essence imposed on the individual. Garfunkel clearly pointed out that ordinary human methodology does not look for essence, it is looking for haecceities, that is, to explore cultural specialities. The practical activities of daily life that are specific, local, and that the actors themselves can reflect on. It can be seen from this that Garfunkel tried to transcend the binary opposition between the subjectivism of phenomenology and the objectivism of structuralism. He tried to reveal that the objective reality of the immortal social order was precisely in the daily life of ordinary actors. It is constantly reproduced in common practice. It is precisely because of this that social order is no longer an objective and latent structural entity that dominates the actions of individuals, nor is it a subjective projection of psychological personality, but can be used in practical activities guided by common sense shared by people. The flowing reality that is directly experienced, the self-evident reality of the social world is nothing but the collective collaboration of those capable members of society in their daily lives. However, daily actors often do not clearly realize this. They live in the world with a self-evident natural attitude. The order phenomenon as an achievement is unnoticed, boring, and inconspicuous, but But it is the "street work" that is visible to everyone, ③even though it is visible to everyone, it is not noticed. However, Garfinkel’s ordinary methodology has not been able to provide much theoretical thinking for reflecting on and criticizing the social order and its self-evident characteristics in the process of trying to show the construction of order. Perhaps this is precisely what Garfinkel did. It is an attempt to avoid, but it does expose the limitations of Garfunkel’s methodology of ordinary people. Sociological issues are far from just the daily construction of social order, such as the ignorance of broad and narrow political issues [英]Bert: " Social Theory in the Twentieth Century, translated by Qu Tiepeng, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2002, p. 111. It will only make Garfinkel repeat the mistakes of phenomenological conservatism in a different way. At the same time, Garfunkel’s research is keen to reveal the construction of social order in self-evident daily practice, but ignores the analysis of the social construction of social members participating in the construction. In this regard, his research is In a broad sense, it is still not so noticeably affected by the subjective perspective of phenomenology. This influence makes him largely ignore the issue of how daily life actors obtain their social membership, that is, how to master a complete set of daily life The meaning structure of life can also reflect the question of its actions. What's interesting is that these problems have become the focus of other daily life theorists. Foucault and Busia were deeply influenced by structuralist trends, so they focused on the structural analysis of daily life, although they underwent a so-called post-structuralist transformation of traditional structuralist principles under the influence of relativist trends , But this does not prevent them from believing in the objectivist deconstruction of the concept of subject like the structuralists.

It is true that people rarely talk about Foucault as a daily life theorist, but if we imagine to extract the dimension of the daily life world from Foucault’s modern subject-the body mind, then we really can’t imagine what is left. Something meaningful. In fact, we can even assert that Foucault's modern body theory is nothing more than a critical rewriting of Husserl's theory of the world of life. The interesting thing about this formulation is that it uses a concept that Foucault himself did not use (ie the life world) to understand Foucault’s modern subject or body theory. In a sense, this is actually an attempt to restore Foucault. The historical position in the collision of different theoretical thoughts and the historical context implicit in his thoughts. In fact, Nietzsche's perspectiveism, which has profoundly influenced Foucault, implies a relativized dimension of the life world. This way of thinking, through Nietzsche's influence on Heidegger, is in the cycle of hermeneutics to a certain extent Reflected in the ground, Zheng Zhen: "Basic Issues in Cultural Sociology", "Journal of Social Theory" (Hong Kong), Fall 2009. And Nietzsche and Heidegger undoubtedly inspired Foucault to varying degrees. In Foucault’s view, the modern subject endowed with a priori status and free will by Descartes’ intellectualism and even Kant’s subjectivism of philosophical anthropology is nothing more than a specific power-the socio-historical effect of knowledge, which is constructed in practice. To become a subject of social history, to become a subject is to obtain a certain discourse-constructed subjectivity, that is, to generate the illusion of a body subordinate to a specific power strategy, that is, to transform the discourse construction of the humanities into its own subjective identity, and Maintain an unconscious state of the social history of this construction. Foucault believes that the research of humanities cannot go beyond the scope of appearance, and their existence, way of existence, methods and concepts are rooted in cultural events, ③Foucault M., The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York : Vintage Books, 1994, p.371, 370. The validity of its knowledge cannot surpass the cultural region. Humans are not timeless objects of the humanities. The unavoidable historicality of the humanities destroys the universal validity of their own knowledge. Sexual requirements. ③However, it is precisely this kind of science about humans that deeply imprints its illusion of human nature in the daily life of modern people. The image of human beings it has shaped is practical to the modern soul in daily life. Construction.

　　 For Foucault, the power of modernity—knowledge is the discourse practice of constructing the body in the world of daily life. The disciplinary power that constructs the body is at a level completely different from the system and the state. It is not fixed in a specific system or state device, although the latter does resort to it. ⑤Foucault M., Discipline and Publish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, p.26, 30. In fact, although there are inextricably linked disciplinary powers and governance mechanisms, fortune Ke has always tried to show that it is not a top-down state power, nor is it a product derived from the latter. On the contrary, disciplinary techniques are scattered on the lower social level on which the ruling power is based, that is, the daily life. Hierarchy, the dominant power over daily life is only the generalized consequence of power technology from daily life. The ubiquitous network of disciplinary power has laid the self-evident foundation of daily life for the dominant power (this also implies Disciplinary power is inherently related to oppression and inequality in the relationship of governance). Foucault described disciplinary power, a new type of power relationship in modern society, as a power of daily life, which is why disciplinary power is always dispersed in various routine time and space arrangements, and is obsessed with repetition of the body. Exercise, only in the routine and repetitive operation of daily life, the knowledge construction dominated by power can be transformed into physical unconsciousness. However, the productive nature of disciplinary power does not mean emancipation. Compared with blatant violence, the coercion of discipline is more hidden and more effective. The knowledge of the humanities implies a strategy of power in its appearance of truth, and what the practice of discourse about human subjectivity brings is only the suppression of more reasonable possibilities (the suppression of freedom), which it shapes The soul is nothing but a prison for the body. ⑤

Foucault explores the world of daily life in modern society in a way that is opposed to the subjectivism and conservatism of phenomenology. He tries to show that the natural attitude of the life world is nothing but a social historical construction, and tries to reveal modern daily life. The social and historical violence implied in the seemingly self-evident state of life, and his way of expounding this point of view is entirely an objectivist position that denies the subject's initiative. Criticizing and rejecting the transcendental subject described by the rationality of the Enlightenment, understanding this subject as a tame body as a passive object of power-knowledge, which allows us to see the other side of the theory of daily life, which does not deny The basic status of daily life, but the foundation of daily life is dominated by an objectivist force. Coincidentally, from the perspective of daily consumption, Busia also shows us the objectivism of daily life. If Foucault always prefers to write about the history of the present, then Busia will focus more on the present.